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Pricing Mortgages: An Interpretation of the Models and Results
Patric H. Hendershott and Robert Van Order
Twenty years ago, nearly all mortgages had long-term fixed rates and most
were originated and held for investment by heavily regulated housing-finance
institutions granted tax preferences for investing their cheap deposit dollars
in mortgages. Today, deposits are more expensive, tax preferences are
-
miniscule,and the regulations are eroding; most mortgages are not held by
their originators, and many are widely traded; many mortgages do not have fixed
rates; most new investment is in mortgage—backed securities (MBSs) rather than
whole loans; and MBSS are now being placed in collateralized mortgage
obligations (CMOs) or "stripped". The accurate pricing of various mortgage
loans, MBSs,andclaims on parts of the MBSs has become a major concern.
It is by now widely recognized that debt securities can be viewed as
risk—free assets plus various contingent claims, which are frequently modeled
as options. This approach is applicable to mortgages (see Findley and Capozza,
1977, for an early discussion). For instance, prepayment is a call option
(i.e., an option to buy back or call the mortgage at par), and default is a put
option (i.e., an option to sell or put the house to the lender at a price equal
to the value of the mortgage). The application of the formal continuous—time
stock and bond option-pricing methodology (Black and Scholes, 1973; Brennan and
Schwartz, 1977; Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CI&R), 1976/1985ab; and Merton, 1973)
has been the centerpiece of most mortgage pricing research (early references
are Asay, 1978, and Dunn and McConnell, 1981). In recent years, this high-tech
literature has grown geometrically (as exemplified by the October 1984 issue of
the Housing Finance Review, the Fall 1985 issue of the AREUEA Journal, and a
recent stream of unpublished papers by Kau et al, 1985 and 1986ab)—2—
This paper interprets the growing body of formal pricing literature and
offers suggestions to make the technology more useful in pricing mortgages.
The great insight of the models comes from determining equilibrium prices by
imposing zero arbitrage profits; such models give exact, rather than simply
qualitative, predictions about mortgage prices. The models combine a carefully
chosen portfolio of nonmortgage assets (whose risk and cash flows are identical
to those of the mortgage contract being modelled) with mortgages to create a
synthetic investment that is instantaneously risk free. That the return on the
risk—free portfolio equal the instantaneous risk free rate gives the basic
equilibrium condition. In simple cases, specific borrower and lender
characteristics are irrelevant, and the number of parameters required for
pricing is small. When transaction costs are incorporated, specific
characteristics often matter, and pricing is more complex, but presumably more
accurate.
Our paper has four sections. The first considers a standard fixed—rate,
long—term mortgage assuming no default risk. Such a mortgage (which may be
viewed as a pool of individual mortgages) is portrayed as a riskiess annuity
plus the borrower's right to prepay (to buy the mortgage back at the remaining
book value). In Section II, the analysis is extended to other instruments:
parts of the fixed—rate mortgage's cash flows (tranches of a collateralized
mortgage obligation or strips of mortgage pools) and adjustable-rate mortgages
with rate caps and floors. Mortgage default is introduced in Section III,
first alone (a nonprepayable mortgage) and then in conjunction with the
prepayment option. The analysis is then extended to the valuation of mortgage
insurance contracts. The relatively few efforts to price mortgages
realistically and to test the models against market data are discussed in
Section IV, and an overview of future research opportunities is offered.—3—
The formal option pricing methodology requires some technical apparatus,
but it is not our major concern. Rather, we focus on intuitive interpretations
to underscore the economic logic underlying the analysis and to assess the
simulation experiments that have been undertaken because closed—form solutions
to the models do not exist. In this area, comparative static analysis must be
based on simulation results and intuition.
I. Default—Free Fixed-Rate Mortgages
A default-free assumable fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) can be viewed as a
continuous-payment annuity with a call option giving the borrower (seller) the
right to repurchase the annuity at a price equal to its par value atany time
before maturity (typically 30 years). Under our assumption of no default risk,
the value of a FRM depends on its coupon rate, time to maturity, other details
of the contract, and the pattern of market interest rates. Pricing models seek
to find and evaluate a function that explains observed prices of mortgages:
M(R,t), where R is a vector of interest rates and t is time. We begin by
describing the basic model and go on to extend it in a number of directions,
including introducing transaction costs. We conclude by discussing techniques
for solving the models.
Before turning to specific models, we note four points that apply to all
models:
(1) The basic equilibrium condition for any mortgage is that its
expected instantaneous yield equal the risk-free rate plus an appropriate
risk premium. The models that follow derive this equality, but because
this notion of equilibrium is so straightforward, we could startby
making it an initial assumption.
(2) The equilibrium condition turns out to be a second-order partial
differential equation in R and t and other variables (e.g., houseprices
if default is possible). This sort of equation willapply to
contingent claim. Hence, an infinite number of functions satisfy the
equation. To determine the one function that applies to the mortgage
being priced, we incorporate boundary conditions specifying the details
of the contract such as the coupon rate, the term of themortgage, and
the value of R at which the mortgage will be called (usually determined
via an optimal call strategy).—4—
(3) The solution for M(R,t), not surprisingly, has an expected-present—
value interpretation. M is the expected present value of the cash-flows
(including call and default) from the mortgage, discounted at the risk—
free rate, but where the expected value of R, upon which future cash
flows (e.g., because of prepayment) depends, is altered by a risk-
adjustment factor.
(4) The modelsdeterminemortgage price, not yield. Yield is usually
measured as the internal rate of return computed for a given assumption
about prepayment (e.g., prepayment in 12 years). Because expected
prepayment can vary greatly, depending on the mortgage coupon, whether
the mortgage is assumable, etc., conventional yield calculations can be
very misleading.
A. The Basic Model
Here we discuss a simple frictionless continuous—time model of mortgage
pricing, which draws on Dunn and McConnell (1981), Buser and Hendershott
(1984), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), and Kau, et al (1986a). We begin by
specifying the state variables and the arbitrage condition and then derive the
pricing equation.
1. State Variables
A default—free, fixed—rate mortgage is risky for two reasons. First,
interest-rate movements change the value of any fixed income security. Second,
mortgages can be refinanced when rates fall. This creates an asymmetry in
mortgage payoffs: when rates increase, the value of the security falls, as
with any fixed-income security, but when rates fall, the rise in value is
limited because of borrowers' refinancing opportunities. Thus interest rates
are natural exogenous or "state" variables in the model. Because a mortgage
can be outstanding for up to 30 years, all interest rates up to 30 years are
potential state variables; which is to say M could depend on a large number of
variables. The problem can only be managed if a small number of basic interest
rates determine the other rates.—5—
Like most authors, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (CI&R, 1976/85) being the
first, we begin by assuming that all interest rates are driven by a single
exogenous rate, the instantaneous short rate, r. Changes in this rate are
taken to follow an "Ito process," the evolution of which is governed by the
following stochostic differential equation:
(1.1) dr= u(r,t)dt +(r,t)dz.
In (1.1), u(r,t)dt is the expected change in r over an infinitesimal interval
of time of length dt, and (r,t)dz is a disturbance made up of dz, which is
normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance, and 5(r,t), which allows
r and t to affect the disturbance. Equation (1.1) is a continuous—time version
of a standard difference equation. CI&R, Vasicek (1977), Dothan (1978), and
Richard (1978) have shown how (1.1) can be used to determine the entire
Treasury yield curve.2
A particular specification used in several mortgage pricing studies and
analyzed in detail by CI&R is
(1.1') dr =k(e-r)dt+cr½dz,
where k and a are positive constants. In this specification, r tends to revert
to its mean level, 8, at rate k; the variance of the disturbance decreases less
than proportionately as r falls (so that low interest rates are less volatile)
and goes to zero as r goes to zero (so that negative interest rates cannot
exist).
2. Perfect Markets Arbitrage Model
Pricing comes from arbitrage in complete markets.3 We begin by
constructing a portfolio of Treasury securities whose cash flows exactly mimic
those expected on the mortgage. Thus, the combination of the mortgage and a
short position in the Treasury portfolio (the hedge portfolio) absorbs zero—6—
wealth and has zero instantaneous risk. Dunn and McConnell, 1981, Buser and
Hendershott, 1984, and Brennan and Schwartz, 1977 and 1985, among others,show
how this portfolio is derived. Absence of arbitrage profits implies a zero
instantaneous return. From this zero return, the basic equilibrium condition
is deduced: the instantaneous expected yield on the mortgage must equal the
risk—free short rate plus a risk factor (see Brennan and Schwartz, 1985, for a
general derivation).
In the case of one state variable,
(1.2) uM(r,t) =rM+ X(r,t)6(r,t)M,
where U is the expected yield of the mortgage, r the instantaneous risk—free
rate, A the market price of risk, and Mr the partial derivative of M with
respect to r. The risk-adjustment term becomes the product of three terms:
the "price" of the risk that r changes, A, the amount of risk, ,andthe
interest—rate sensitivity of the mortgage, M. If more state variables exist,
more risk—adjustment terms, each with its own A, come into being.
The arbitrage model does not derive the X'S; their derivation is a
general equilibrium problem (see CI&R l976/85b) that requires knowledge of such
market forces as traders' risk aversion. The model does imply that the x's are
objective prices which are the same for all traders. Thus the x's may be
viewed as competitive prices for insurance policies.4 An important pricing
issue is how to estimate the A's. It turns out that the A'S can be inferred
from market prices (see Section B) when the state variables are yields on or
prices of traded assets.
The perfect-market arbitrage model assumes no transaction costs are
incurred either in shorting the portfolio of Treasuries or in continuously
adjusting the portfolio as the expected cash flows from the mortgage change.
Theexistenceof such costs implies that arbitrage will keep the mortgage price—7—
within a range, the width of which depends on the magnitude of the relevant
costs. We focus on the perfect—market arbitrage model as a first approximation
to pricing.
3. Pricing Equations
The next step is the derivation of U,theexpected return on the
mortgage. This is a technical step that requires some knowledge of Stochastic
Calculus. Particularly heavy use is made of Ito's lemma, which is the
stochastic analogue of the chain rule of ordinary calculus.5 The result, which
we simply assert, has a fairly straightforward interpretation. The expected
instantaneous return consists of the coupon rate and expected percentage
capital gains. The coupon rate is simply the coupon payment, C, divided by M.
Expected percentage capital gains come from two sources. The first class of
gains occurs if t and r change as expected: we call these "certainty equivalent"
gains. These are given by Mt/N (amortization and capital gain from selling at a
discount) and u(r,t)M/M (expected change in r times the sensitivity of value to
interest rates). The second source flows from the stochastic nature of r.
Because M is, in general, not linear, random increases in r need not have the
same effect on M, in absolute value, as random decreases; thus the certainty
equivalent approach of assuming that r changes exactly by u will not reflect
expected capital gains.
Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical M(r,t) given t. The function is (tenta-
tively) assumed to be convex to the origin. Suppose the current interest rate is
r* and u(r*,t) =0,i.e., r is as likely to go up as it is to go down. Suppose
further that next period's rate will be either r*+t or r*_!i, with equal probabil-
ity. Because of the convex shape of M, the expected level of M at r*, E[M(r*)],
will be greater than N at r*, M[E(r*)J; that is, a capital gain is expected, even
though r is not expected to change, because interest-rate declines raise M by more
than interest—rate increases lower M (the opposite would be the case if M were—8—
concave).6Accounting for this "extra" capital gain requires using Ito's
lemma. Here we simply assert that expected capital gains from the dispersion
of r are given by that is, they depend on the volatility of r and the
shape of M, disappearing if Mr is linear or r isnonstochastic.7






This second-order partial differential equation is the basic equilibrium
condition for the one state variable model. An infinite number of functions of
r and t satisfy this condition (an infinite combination of coupon and capital
gains streams provide a "normal" or equilibrium return). Not surprisingly, we
need to incorporate details of the contract to obtain a unique function.
4. A Unique Function
Mathematically we need three boundary conditions to find the right
M(r,t), one for t and two for r (1.4 is second order in r). The t boundary is
the terminal condition that comes from the amortization schedule of the
mortgage. For a fully amortizing mortgage,
(1.5) M(r,T) =0,
where T is the time at which the last payment is made. The other two
conditions relate to how M is valued when r takes on extreme values. The first
of these conditions incorporates the economic intuition that M becomes
worthless as r approaches infinity:8
(1.6) M(,t) =0.—9—
The final condition specifies the interest rate at which the mortgage is
called.
But before turning to that, we consider the pricing of a benchmark
security, a noncallable mortgage M, that is equivalent to a portfolio of
Treasury securities with constant payout for T years. This is easy to price
because the value of M is just the present value of the known cash flows
discounted at the appropriate rate read off the yield curve determined by
(1.1). Hence M(r,t) looks like AM in Figure 2: i.e., it has the usual
downward sloping concave shape of a fixed-income security (see Brennan and
Schwartz, 1977, and CI&R, 1976/85, for a fuller discussion).
The curve for the callable mortgage, M(r,t), lies below M(r,t) by an
amount equal to the value of the call option. Because the mortgage can be
called when M equals PAR, we know that points in the region above the "PAR
line" cannot be points on M. For the third boundary condition for a callable
mortgage, we use a relationship describing the optimal call strategy for a
borrower. Because r is the only exogenous variable upon which decisions can be
based, the strategy is characterized by the level of r, r, at which the
mortgage is called. Rational borrowers (ignoring transaction costs) must
choose the call strategy that minimizes the value of M. This strategy
maximizes their net worth.9 Of all the M functions satisfying (1.4), (1.5),
and 1.6), the rational borrower chooses the function that has the smallest
value subject to touching the PAR line in the Figure. The curve that does this
(assuming an interior solution) must be tangent to the PAR line, and the level
of r at which it touches is the optimal call raterc for a given t. Hence, the
final boundary condition is:
(1.7) M (r ,t) =0at M =PAR,
- rc
which gives the minimum M(r,t), represented by the BCM curve in Figure 2.—10—
A few observations on this equilibrium model follow:
1. While M is convex throughout, M becomes concave as r approaches r.
Traders call this feature "negative convexity". It reflects the price
of the security anticipating the call option even when r is not
especially close to r.
2. Whereas volatility tends to produce capital gains on average for
noncallable mortgages (see Figure 1), negative convexity implies that
volatility produces capital losses on average for mortgages close to
being called. Hence, volatility makes callable mortgages less valuable
when they are near exercise. This is nothing more than a reflection of
the proposition that options increase in value as volatility increases.
3. Again, the solution has an expected—present—value interpretation. In
particular, M is the expected present value of future cash flows,
discounted at r, with the expected value of dr given by u —X6M rather
than just u (see CI&R, 1976/85b, lemma 4).
4. The coupon need not be constant. For example, the model is capable
of pricing graduated—payment mortgages, for which C is a rising
function of time, and price-level-adjusted mortgages, by putting the
analysis into "real" terms..
B. Extensions
1. Adding State Variables
a. Interest Rates
A logical extension of the model is to increase the number of interest
rate variables. Taken literally, the one-rate model above implies a constant
rate toward which the short rate reverts for all time. Given the obvious
importance of changing inflation on interest rates, this seems like a difficult
model to take seriously (although this may not be of empirical significance,
see section IV below). The nominal rate could be defined as the sum of the
real rate and the expected inflation rate, and these components could be viewed
as being governed by separate processes, requiring two state variables (CI&R
and Richards, 1978)
In their two state variable model, Brennan and Schwartz (1985) assume
different mean reverting processes for the short rate and the rate on a long-
term consol bond. Adding a state variable changes the equilibrium condition
(1.4),asdiscussed in the previous section. The expected return on the—11—
mortgage now equals the risk—free rate plus adjustments for:(1) the risk of
the short rate changing as in (1.4), and (2) the risk of the long rate
changing. This leads to a generalization of (1.4). If we let c be the long—
term (consol) rate, and be the variances of changes in r and c, ,be
their correlation coefficient, u1 and u2 be their means and and be their
risk prices, then a second—order Taylor series approximation to equilibrium is
given by
(1.8) M PS162+ M(u1 -A1S1)+ M(u2 —A22)+ Mt + C =rM.
What is interesting in this case is that the values of A2 and u2 can be
inferred. Because (1.8) applies to the value of a consol, by substituting the
value, 1/c, of a consol paying $1 into (1.8) and evaluating the derivatives (Mc
=-1/c2,M =2/c3,and Mr =0),we can solve for A22, and, by substituting
the result back into (1.8), produce an expression that contains neither nor
u2 (see Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). This insight comes directly from the
arbitrage approach and is directly analogous to the result in Black and Scholes
(1973) that we do not need to know the mean reverting value of a stock or its
risk price to price an option on the stock. The result, which holds for any
state variable that is a traded asset, is also useful in the analysis of
default (treated in Section lIlA). In the one state model, we could not
eliminate u or A because the instantaneous security is not a traded asset; it
does not have a price that we can plug back into (1.8)
b. Default on Fully-Insured FRMs
No default—free, assumable mortgages exist, but GNMA5, which are pools of
mortgages guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association, a branch
of the U.S. government, are a close approximation. GNMA5 are assumable by the
new homeowner should the house be sold, and they are fully insured. The major
difference between a GNMA and a default—free FRM is that the payoff from—12—
insurance in the event of default is the par, rather than market, value of the
security. Hence, default can still produce a gain or loss for investors. In
general, the possibility of defaults on fully—insured callable mortgagesraises
their value; defaults that might occur when mortgages are above par, and thus
would generate capital losses, tend not to occur because the mortgages would
already have been prepaid but defaults that occur when mortgages are below par
give a windfall gain to the mortgage owners. The possibility of this windfall
will keep the mortgages close to par. Whether this effect is quantitatively
important is, of course, an empirical question.
Kau et al (l986a) and Rosenberg (1986) model mortgages with both default
and prepayment by adding a new state variable, house price, H, to the one—state
interest rate model (as explained in Section III). Both papers have a two
state variable model in r and H, with an equilibrium condition like (1.8) with
H replacing c, to simulate prices and values of the default option. In the
case where house price and interest rate variances are "high" relative to
recent experience and there is no covariance between r and H, Kau et al (1986a,
Table 8) compute that an insured but "defaultable" 80 percent loan-to—value
mortgage has a 6 basis point smaller coupon than a similarly priced default-
free mortgage.12 For 95 percent loan—to-value mortgages, the difference is 12
basis points. For moderate variances, the differences would probably be
negligible, so we might be comfortable applying the model in Section 4 to GNMA5.
c. Due on Sale
Many mortgages are not fully assumable. Major examples are the pass-
through securities guaranteed by the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). In general, the
automatic repayment when a household moves raises the value of a below—par
nonassumable mortgage, and mortgages that would have been above par would have
already been called.—13—
Valuing nonassumable mortgages requires a potentially troublesome
analysis of household mobility (Cassidy, 1983), including recognition that the
potential forced prepayment when mortgages are far below par alters the
incentive to move (Hendershott and Hu, 1982). In principle, nonassumability





It is clear (see Foster and Van Order, 1985, and Green and Shoven, 1986)
that households do not exercise their options as ruthlessly as the models we
have elaborated imply. While prepayments accelerate when interest rates fall,
some high—coupon mortgages remain outstanding. Moreover, while prepayments
decelerate when interest rates rise, some low-coupon assumable mortgages
continue to prepay. For this reason many researchers have added ad hoc
prepayment functions that allow prepayments for reasons other than hitting the
boundary condition.
For instance, Dunn and McConnell (1981) and Brennan and Schwartz (1985)
add random prepayrnents, which they model as Poisson processes, to "rational"
prepaymerits given by the boundary condition (1.7). If p is the probability of
a random prepayment, then the expected cash flow (C in (1.4)) is increased by
p(M-PAR). Boundary conditions are as before.
Dale—Johnson and Langetieg (1986) and Dietrich et al (1983) model FRM5 in
a similar way. Whereas the Poisson approach assumes that the entire mortgage
pool pays off simultaneously, these papers assume gradual prepayment (half in
Dietrich et al) when call is optimal, which is especially important in the
analysis of instruments such as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations that—14—
allocate payments sequentially to different classesof security holders. Not
surprisingly, these "nonrational" prepaymeritsmake the borrowers' call option
less valuable and mortgages more valuable.
b. Transaction Costs
presumably borrowers do not exercise their option ruthlesslybecause of
implicit and explicit transaction costs. For instance,if a prepayment penalty
must be paid to the investor, then the model is the same asdepicted in Figure
2 except that the tangency at r is with a horizontalline that exceeds PAR by
the amount of the penalty, PEN. Thus (1.7) becomes
(1.7') M(r,t) =0at M =PAR+PEN.
The mortgage value functions with and without the penalty aredrawn in Figure
3. The value function without a prepayment penalty is given by AM;with the
penalty the function is given by BM. The level of r atwhich the mortgage is
called falls from r0 to r' when the penalty is introduced.
Another transaction cost is the cost of taking out a new mortgage. To
the borrower this is the same as the prepayment penalty model, a new tangency
with a higher exercise price. However, because this "refinancing wedge"is not
paid to the investor, the value to the investor is lower thanwhen the cost is
a prepayment penalty. The investor's boundary condition is nowdifferent from
the borrower's. For a refinancing wedge equal to PEN, the borrower determines
r' by the tangency condition depicted in Figure 3 by the curve BM. Given this,
the boundary condition determining value to the investor, i.e., the market
price, is that M(r,t) equal PAR, as depicted by CM. Not only do wehave
negative convexity, but a range exists over which falling interest rates lower
mortgage value (and thus "duration" is negative). Intuitively, thisis
because refinancing costs allow the mortgage value to exceed par, but the value
must come back to par when interest rates decline sufficiently to make—15—
refinancing very likely. Buser and Hendershott (1984) incorporate the
refinancing wedge into their simulations, and they do indeed (Table5, p. 420)
obtain the "negative duration" results (find thatfalling interest rates lower
value) in some of their simulatjons)4
C. Solution Techniques
Because no closed-form solution to the model exists,numerical methods
are needed to obtain mortgage prices. Takingadvantage of the expected present
value property discussed above, one might usea random number generating device
to generate numerous interest—rate scenarios, calculatepresent values for each
scenario, and average the results. Unfortunately, thisMonte Carlo technique
won't work because the key element of cashflow, when prepayment occurs,
depends on the value of the mortgage, which is not knownin the middle of the
simulation.
Numerical procedures exist for solvingdifference—equation approximations
to equations like (1.4). These are discussedin Brennan and Schwartz (1977),
Kau et al (l986a), and McDonald (1987). Herewe discuss a simple technique
developed by Bartter and Rendleman (1979). Thetechnique assumes risk
neutrality (A=0) and uses a simple binomial approximationto the interest-rate
process given by (1.11.15 The approximation is that thechange in r can take
on two values, up or down, with knownprobability. This simple scheme is used
by Hall (1985) to price callable mortgages.
Figure 4 illustrates how the pricing techniquesworks in a simple 4-
period model, with and without transaction costs.The interest rate is
initially 10% and must either increase or decreaseby one percentage point with
equal probability; the distribution of interestrate levels at the beginning of
the four periods is depicted in Figure 4a.Now consider a bond that pays $10
in interest at the end of eachperiod plus $100 in principal at the end of the—16-
final period. Figure 4b depicts possible prices at the beginning of each
period (with some rounding error). At the beginning of thefinal period,
interest rates will be 13, 11, 9, or 7 percent, and the bonds will be worth
(approximately) 97.3 (110/1.13), 99.1 (110/1.11), 100.9 (110/1.09) or 102.8
(110/1.07). Moving backward one period, if rates were at 8 percent (the lower
path), then bond holders would get $10 in interest plus a fifty-fifty chance at
either a $100.9 bond or a $102.8 bond. Assuming traders are risk neutral, the
value of this lottery will be the expected present value: [10 +
102.8) J/l.08 =103.6.Similarly, if rates were at 12 percent (the higher
path), the value of the bond at the beginning of period 3 would be about 96.6.
Going back to the initial period, the market price would be 100.1. The excess
over PAR comes from risk neutrality and the phenomenon depicted in Figure 1.
Suppose that the bond can be called at 100. The pricing is depicted in
Figure 4c. At the beginning of the last period we have a simple choice: pay
$110 in one period or pay $100 now (call the loan). If the interest rate is 9
or 7 percent, we call [110/(l+r) > 100]; if the rate is 13 or 11 percent, we
don't call. Moving back a period, we see that if the rate is 8 percent, we pay
either the $10 interest and accept a $100 liability at the end of the period
(the bond will be worth $100 next period whether r is 9 or 17 percent) or we
pay $100 now. Because llO/(l+r) > 100, we call and pay $100, which is the
value of the bond if r is 8 percent in the second period. If r is 12 percent,
the value is the same as in the noncallable case.
Working back to the first period, we see that the value at origination is
$98.8, so that the value of the call option is $1.2. This approach takes
advantage of the expected-present—value interpretation of the model and the
fact that we know the value at the end of the term. The model can be extended—17—
to as many periods as desirable and advantage can be taken of the property of
binomial distributions, that they approach the normal. Thus the simple
binomial process can be made into a good approximation to (1.1).
Note that this backward-solution technique incorporates all the
information used in the perfect-markets arbitrage model. In particular,
(1) requiring that the beginning of period price equal the expected
present value of "payout" at the end of the period, including end—
of-period value, is equivalent to requiring that the one period
expected return (a coupon plus expected capital gain) equal the
risk—free rate, which, with X =0,captures (1.4)
(2)starting at the end automatically captures the terminal condition,
(1.5); because the mortgage in our example is nonamortizing, the
terminal value is par, not zero.
(3)given the limits on the variation in r, (1.6) is irrelevant; but if
we let the number of periods grow, r can become very large and
M(r,t) will approach zero.
(4)that the borrower prepays if the par value in less than the value of
the mortgage if held another period is another way of stating the
optimal prepayment strategy given by (1.7); the borrower chooses the
strategy that minimizes M.
Panels 4d and 4e show bond prices with transactions costs. A $2
prepayment penalty increases value (from $98.8 to $99.7) because borrowers do
not call when the interest rate declines to 9 percent, and when they do call,
lenders receive the $2. A $2 refinancing charge also increases bond value, but
by less than prepayment does because the "old" lender doesn't receive the $2
when call occurs.
While our description emphasizes the binomial model, the numerical
procedures for solving difference equation approximations use the same
principle, that of starting at the end of the term and working backward. With
this method, an interest-rate grid is searched over each period. The problem
with the Monte Carlo method is also clear here. One can't compute prices in
period n without knowing prices in period n+l because they determine whether—18—
call is optimal. Of course, if the call option is not important, as appears to
be the case in the pricing of adjustable-rate mortgages with rate caps, then
the Monte Carlo method works well.
II. Other Default—Free Claims
Numerous new mortgage instruments are now available and need to be
priced. Pools of fixed-rate mortgages are being partitioned, either by unequal
division of the interest and principal repayment components of the cashf lows
("strips") or by shifting the timing of the mortgage prepayments (CMOs). In
addition, large volumes of adjustable-rate mortgages have been issued since
1982, especially in 1984 and 1985. The pricing of these relatively new
instruments is analyzed in this Section.
While the tools of Section I can be used to price mortgage derivatives
(strips and CMOS) in the manner described below, the perfect-capital-market
assumption (zero costs of setting up the hedge portfolio) that underlies these
tools Suggests that mortgage derivatives should not exist. If costs are
incurred in creating the derivatives but no value is added (the parts sum to
the whole in perfect markets), then creating them is a negative net present
value endeavor. No value is added because the procedures used to set up the
GNMA-Treasury hedge portfolio and to derive the pricing function could be used
to generate expected cash flows identical to any derivative. However, if
setting up the hedge portfolio is expensive because of trading costs, then
scale economies might allow investment bankers to create derivatives less
expensively than individual investors could. Thus imperfect markets can be
used to rationalize the rapid growth ($80 billion in two years) of CMOs.'6
Another rationale for mortgage derivatives are accounting and/or tax advantages
(see footnotes 19 and 20). In any event, if derivatives add value (if slick
investment bankers aren't just fooling investors), then the pricing model
cannot be applied exactly.—19-
The discussion below explains strips and CMOs and describes how the
perfect—markets model can be used to price them. In the process, we suggest to
whom these new instruments might appeal if markets were imperfect.
A. Stripped Mortgage—Backed Securities17
Stripped mortgage—backed securities represent unequal proportions of the
cash flows from mortgage pools. For example, a pool could be split into two
parts, with each subpool entitled to half of the principal, but one receiving
only one-third of the interest and the other two-thirds. Assuming that the
underlying pool is valued near par, the first strip will sell at a discount and
the second at a premium. Earnings from the parts would respond differently to
declines in interest rates that might trigger prepayment, the discount part
reaping capital gains and the premium part suffering capital losses.
Pricing strips is a fairly straightforward extension of pricing the
underlying mortgage pools. Let us flesh out the previous example, setting
underlying pool coupon rate at 9 percent so that the two strips earn 6 and 12
percent, respectively, on half of the principal.18 The monthly payments based
on a 9% coupon are first divided into interest and principal and then
subdivided 1/3:2/3 (the interest) or 1/2:1/2 (the principal). Equation (1.4)
can be solved for each component, after replacing C with either C/3 or 2C/3.
The call condition which determines r, (1.8), is unchanged because call is
based upon the value of the underlying mortgages, not the individual strip,
reaching PAR. With no imperfections, every mortgage in the pool pays off at
the same moment; each strip receives half of PAR, so that the boundary
condition for each is M(rc,t) =PAR/2.
Figure 5 plots prices for the underlying mortgage pool and the two strips
for different values of r, assuming no transaction costs (or imperfections)
The value function for the underlying pool is identical to the DEM line in
Figure 2. The strips, M6 and M12, have values equal to half of PAR at call;—20—
M12 always lies above M6 prior to call, reflecting thedifference in coupons;
and M6 +M12 = Mat all r. Note the sharply different responses to interest—
rate declines as the interest rate approaches the call rate. As expectations
of the below—market 6 percent coupon being called increase, value rises
sharply; at the same time the far above-market 12 percent coupon declines in
value (the shorter expected life of the interest payments outweighs the
increase in present value coming from the lower rate at which the cash flows
are discounted).
Figure 6 plots the price curves for a more severe stripping and the
underlying mortgage pool. Here an 11 percent coupon is divided 4.95 and 6.05
between the two parts, and the principal is divided 99 and 1 percent. Thus the
first part pays a 5 percent coupon (4.95/.99) and the second a 605 percent
coupon (6.05/.01). The latter is close to an interest only security (an 10),
while the low-coupon strip is not far from a principal only (P0) security.
Pure lOs and POs are popular strips. The positive slope of the 605 percent
coupon strip over a wide range of r, and the extreme negative slope of the 5
percent coupon strip are startling.19 The 605 percent coupon could be
especially valuable to thrifts who could use it to offset their long positions
in mortgages; note that a portfolio split equally between 11 percent mortgages
and the 605 strip would appear to be insensitive to changes in interest rates
over a wide range. The 5 percent might appeal to pension funds with their
long—term fixed dollar liabilities.
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B. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
While CMOS take a wide variety of forms, the trick is to divide
amortizing mortgages into different maturities: a short one for investors such
as thrift institutions who dislike the "long" repricing period of FRMs, a
long-one for investors such as pension funds and life insurance companies who
dislike the "short" average life of FRM5, and a catch all in—between category—21—
for God knows whom, to account for the remaining cash flows. The classic CMO
slices the mortgage pool into four sections or portions (tranches from the
french trancher, to cut) by maturity. The shortest three receive interest as
they accrue. The last is often an accrual security "Z bond" with no interest
paid prior to repayment of the principal; until then the face principal rises
at the stated coupon rate for the tranche. The first tranche is repaid
entirely prior to any repayment of the other tranches (receives all distributed
principal repayments), the second prior to any repayment of the third and
fourth, etc.
What can complicate CMO structures is that the interest earned on the
underlying mortgage pool need not be allocated directly among the tranche
holders. Rather, each tranche usually earns a different coupon rate, such that
the pattern of tranche coupons at the time of issue matches that on Treasury
securities of comparable maturity. For example, with 2,7,10 and 20 year par—
value Treasuries paying 6,7,7.5 and 8 percent, the four tranches might pay 6.5,
7.75, 8.5 and 9.25 percent. If the pool has a coupon above those on all the
tranches, there is no problem. But what if the underlying mortgage coupon is
8.5 percent in our example? If the first three tranches prepay immediately, to
take an extreme example, only 8.5 percent interest will be available to pay
holders of the fourth tranche, although they have been promised 9.25 percent.
The conventional solution to this problem is overcollateralization.21
The CMO originator might issue only $90 million of CMOs for $100 million of
mortgage pools. Thus, when principal payments are made (scheduled or early),
not all is used to retire the first tranche. To achieve a triple-A credit
rating, a collateralization/payment rule must be followed to ensure that the
outstanding CMO tranches are small enough that the cash flows from the
remaining collateral prove sufficient to make all promised payments to the
remaining tranche holders. The rule is: if any tranche has a coupon greater—22—
than that on the underlying mortgage pool, then the outstandingCMO principal
must be less than the present value of the mortgage payments(1) assuming no
prepayment and (2) using the highest coupon paid on anyof the tranches as the
discount rate.
In effect, a fifth or "residual" investor in the underlying mortgage pool
exists to "finance" the excess collateral. The difference between thecash
flow received from the underlying mortgage pool and the CMO payments (interest
and principal) goes to the residual holder. Moreover, even if the mortgage
isn't overcollateralized (it has a coupon greater than tranche coupons), the
tranches are generally paid quarterly or semiannually so that the residual
investor gets to use this "float" (and accepts some interest—rate risk). While
the residual claim is usually held by the CMO originator, this claim can be
sold and can be priced like the other parts of the CMO.
Pricing the tranches is similar to pricing mortgage strips. The cash
flows must be carefully identified, taking into account the timing of principal
payments as driven by the collateralization requirement (where relevant)
Further, the value of all tranches goes to par upon call, which is determined
by borrower behavior vis—a-vis the underlying mortgages.
Figure 7 illustrates the price behavior of a three—tranche CMO and its
underlying mortgage pool, assuming perfect arbitrage and no transaction costs.
To simplify the diagram, all tranches are assumed to place equal claims on the
mortgage principal and to have coupons below that on the underlying pool (no
overcollateralization). The value responses of the tranches (M1, M2 and M3) to
changes in interest rates are markedly different. The short tranche responds
little given its short life, while the accruing Z-bond drops off sharply (has a
far steeper slope than the underlying mortgage pool).
Again, the perfect-markets pricing model requires that the parts
(tranches in this case) sumtothe whole. Just as with strips, the pure—
arbitrage assumption has to be relaxed for the origination of CMOs to have—23—
economic value. Further, with the optimal call model and no mortgage
transaction costs (or equal costs for all borrowers), all tranchesprepay at
the same point in time. This clearly mitigates the point of CMOs (that the
first tranche prepays quickly while the last receives nopayment for perhaps 10
years or longer). Sluggish prepayment, likely based on varying transaction
costs (Section IV), is needed for CMOs to make a lot of sense.
Recent CMOs have departed from the classic form (Roll, 1987). The
innovations are a planned—amortization class (PAC), a tranche whose
amortization follows a known schedule except under extreme prepayment
scenarios, and a floating—rate tranche (almost always with a fairly tight rate
cap). Such CMOs greatly complicate the collateralization issue and the pricing
of the other tranches and the residual. Analyzing these securities liesbeyond
the scope of this paper.
C. Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
Another phenomenon of the 1980s is adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs).
Over a third of the loans originated since 1983 have had adjustablerates, and
during 1984 and 1985 the percentage exceeded a half. Becausepure adjustable-
rate mortgages with short adjustment intervals nevervary significantly from
par, pricing them is trivial, but virtually no pure ARMs exist. Nearly all
have life—of—loan rate caps, and most have per—period adjustmentcaps.
The surge in ARM originations was due to an increasedwillingness of
households to accept interest rate risk, an increased desire of thrift
institutions to reduce interest rate risk, and relaxation of mostgovernmental
restrictions impeding the issuance of ARMs. When high interestrates sharply
reduced the size of loans households could qualify for,ARMs, which had lower
initial coupon rates than FRMs owing to both an upwardsloping yield curve and
the far lower value of call protection given by ARMs (seebelow), became—24—
relatively more valuable to households. Moreover, the desire to match asset
and liability repricing periods led thrifts to structure ARMs to address the
qualification problem (to offer initial teaser or below-market coupon rates).
Rate-capped ARMs are usefully viewed as loans with freely floating rates
combined with both an automatically exercised option to borrow at below—market
rates if interest rates rise too fast (adjustment caps) or too. far (life-of—
loan caps) and an option to refinance if interest rates fall either so fast
that rate floors bind or so far that lowering the base for the life-of-loan cap
is profitable. The ARM acts like an FRM both when interest rates get very low
and when they get very high. When rates are sufficiently low, either the ARM
is called or the interest-rate variance gets so low that the probability of
binding caps becomes zero. When rates are sufficiently high, the life—of-loan
cap binds so tightly that the probability of rates dropping enough for the ARM
coupon to decrease approaches zero. Figure 8 plots the value functions for a
noncallable mortgage AM, an FRM with the same coupon BM, and an ARM whose
coupon plus its life-of-loan cap equals the FRM coupon CM.
Because the rate caps are automatically exercised options, caps can be
valued by Monte Carlo methods (Asay, 1984 and Lea, 1985). However, more
complex valuation techniques are needed if call (which is an endogenously
exercised option) is an important consideration. With call, one has to solve
the pricing problem backward, as shown in Figure 4. But with per period
adjustment caps, a forward solution is also needed because the previous period
coupon rate must be known to determine if the adjustment cap/floor binds. Kau
et al (l986b) have solved this problem by introducing a second state variable
to keep track of the previous period coupon rate so that backward solution
techniques can be used. The importance or value of the call option is thus a
significant issue.—25—
Buser, Hendershott and Sanders (1985, PP. 257—58) argue that the call
option on a 5 percent life—of-loan rate capped ARM has trivial value. The
simulations of Kau et al (198Gb, Table I) confirm this. Even in a high rate—
volatility environment (a = 0.05, see note 11), the call value in a flat
interest—rate environment for a near-par ARM with a 5-point life-of-loan cap
and no per—period cap (an= /5 ARM) is 0.005 percent of value with no
transactions costs. The same values for ARMs with per-period rate caps/floors
of 1 and 2 percentage points along with the 5—point life-of—loan cap (1/5 and
2/5 ARMs) are 1.42 and 0.35 percent. If refinancing costs were added, as in
Section IB, the value of call on the 2/5 ARM, the most popular of all ARMs
originated, even in a high rate-volatility environment, would probably be
negligible.22 Thus, Monte Carlo methods that ignore the prepayment option are
likely sufficient for pricing 2/5 and =/5 ARMs in a high volatility environment
and even the 1/5 ARM in a low volatility environment.
III. Pricing Default Risk
The model of default risk is analogous to that of prepayment risk.
Default may be viewed either as a put option that gives the borrower the right
to sell the house to the lender at a price equal to the value of the mortgage
or a call option that gives the borrower the right to buy back the mortgage in
exchange for the house. As in Section I we first analyze a frictionless model,
where the lender's only recourse is to take over the house, and work our way up
to more complicated models that incorporate other costs. To keep matters
simple, we begin by assuming constant (or at least nonstochastic) interest
rates, so that we do not have to worry about interest—rate fluctuations and
prepayments made in response to them. In the extensions, this assumption is
relaxed and transaction costs are introduced. A discussion of mortgage default
insurance concludes the section.—26—
A. The Basic Model
The options approach to valuing default in mortgages began with Asay,
1978 (see also Masulis, 1982). Cunningham and Hendershott (1984), Epperson et.
al. (1985) and Kau et. al. (1986a) have studied similar models. The structure
of these models parallels that of the prepayment model in Section I.
The basic model has one state variable, house price. We assume that the
change in house prices (H) is given by
(3.1) dH =uH(H,t)dt
+cS(H,t)dz,
which is interpreted as before. While this function can take on a variety of
forms, the most common is
(3.1') dH =hHdt+cHdz,
which implies that the percentage change in H has a constant mean and variance.
As in Section I, we view the mortgage as made up of a basic default—free
mortgage, M(r,t), minus an option, in this case to default on subsequent
payments, D(r,H,t). We assume that r is constant and supress it.
The papers cited above proceed by focusing on a portfolio of mortgages
and housing constructed to have no instantaneous risk. As was the case in
Section I, the zero arbitrage equilibrium condition implies that the expected
return on the mortgage must equal the risk free rate plus an adjustment for
risk. The analogue to equation (1.2) is
(3.2) uM(H,t) =rM+
where is the price of house price risk.—27—
As in the case of the two-state variable model in Section I-B (from
Brennan and Schwartz, 1977 and 1985), the value of the risk adjustment can be
inferred. Indeed in this case the inference is straightforward. We know that
the expected return on the house itself, composed of service flow ("dividend")
and expected capital gains, is given by
(3.3) RH =sH+ UH(Hlt)f
where s is the per dollar service flow from the house. For reasons identical
to those behind (1.2), equilibrium in the market for holding houses requires
that:
(3.4) RH =rH+ XHS(H,t)
Equating (3.3) and (3.4), can be inferred from
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(3.5) AH6(H,t) =sH+ UH -rH.
The expected yield on the mortgage, for the same reasons developed in
Section II for equation (1.3), is given by
(3.6) UM =C+ Mt + uH(HEt)MH +
Substituting (3.5) and (3.6) into (3.2) yields
(3.7) C + Mt + (r-s)HMH + rM,
which is the basic equilibrium condition.
Note that both A and u. the expected growth rate in house prices, have
been eliminated, just as both the risk premium for and expected growth rate of
the long rate were eliminated in the Brennan—Schwartz two—state call model.—28—
unfortunately, the elimination is somewhat less valuable here because the
service flow or "rent" from the house is added as a determining variable. This
flow is not easily specified.
As before, an infinity of curves satisfies (3.7), and three boundary
conditions are needed (one for t and two for H) to determine the optimal one.
Again, the terminal condition reflects amortization:
(3.8) M(H,T) =0,
as in (1.5). Also, the value of the default option goes to zero as H
approaches infinity. Equivalently, the mortgage's value approaches that of the
comparable default—free mortgage:
(3.9) M(cx,,t) =Mor D(€,t) =0.
As before, the final or free boundary condition comes from assuming
rational exercise of the option. Ignoring transaction costs or recourse that
reaches into owner resources beyond the house, the option will be exercised
when M =H.Figure 9 depicts the value of the mortgage (at a given t) as a
function of H. The value of the default-free mortgage is simply its par value
as represented by the horizontal line M. M lies below that line by the value
of the default option, D. M must also be on or below the 45 degree line along
which H =M.Finally, M approaches M (D goes to zero) as H goes to infinity.
The higher is the initial house value (H in the figure) and thus the lower the
loan-to-value ratio, the lower is D at that time.
As in Section I, an optimal exercise strategy exists. Because the option
is exercised along the 45-degree line, the problem is to find the critical H,
H, at which to put the house to the lender, subject to touching the 45-degree
line. Again the borrower chooses an H, determining a function M(H,t), that—29—
minimizes the value of the mortgage (his liability) for any value of H. The
lowest curve that satisfies (3.8) and (3.9) and still touches the 45-degree
line is the one that is just tangent to the 45 degree line. Again assuming an
interior solution, the condition that nails down the price function is:
(3.10) MH (H ,t)1 [DH(H,t) =1]at M =H.
This fully specifies a very simple model of the price of a defaultable
mortgage. While we analyze default insurance below, here we note that the up—
front premium, I, for 100 percent insurance when M =PARissimply D in the
model.
Twoobservationson this model are:
(1) This model of default is entirely equity based; people default if
and only if they have no equity. But equity is measured by H-M, not H-M,
the usual measure of equity. The difference is that H—M includes the
value of the option to default in the future. Rational households with
house price only slightly less than mortgage balance do not default; the
gain from default is less than the cost of putting up equity on another
house purchase, equity that would be at risk. Households maintain the
option to default later on because they have an underpriced option.
(2)The value of M is independent of borrowers' characteristics, unless
they affect the equation for house price (e.g., slovenly individuals
might raise s) .Note,in particular, that "payment burden" has no place
in this model. A borrower who can't make the payments sells the house if
there is positive equity; if there is negative equity, default occurs in
any event. In extended versions with costs of exercising the option
(discussed below), personal characteristics are more likely to matter.
B. Extensions
Here we consider two extensions, similar to those in I—B, adding more
state variables and transaction costs.
1. Adding State Variables
Asay (1978), Epperson et al (1985), Kau, et al (l986a), Titman and Torous
(1986), and Rosenberg (1986) add the short rate to the model. The main reason
for the extra variable is that when r changes, the value of the mortgage—30—
changes, affecting equity and therefore default. For instance, a declinein H
that would otherwise trigger a default might not if r has risen because the
borrower would wish to maintain what is now a low-rate mortgage.
We want to specify a pricing function M(r,H,t). Formally, the analysis
proceeds along lines entirely analogous to the two state Brennan—Schwartz model
in Section I, where the subscript 2 now denotes house price and subscript 1









Note that, as above, we do not need to know the price of house—price risk or
the expected growth of house prices, but we cannot eliminate these terms for r.
We assume first that M is a fixed-rate mortgage with no prepayment
option. In that case, the five boundary conditions (one for t and two each for
r and H) resemble those of the one state variable model with call [equations
(1.5), (1.6) and (1.7)] but with default [(3.9) and (3.1O)).24 The difference
in boundary conditions is that default, not call, can now be triggered by an
interest-rate decline. Hence, we need to replace (1.7) with a condition for
default when r changes. The condition is illustrated by the BM curve in Figure
10. When r falls sufficiently, equity will be zero. For reasons entirely
analogous to those behind Figure 2 and equation (1.7), the new boundary
condition becomes:
(3.12) M(rd,t) =0at M =H.
where rd is the critical default interest rate. As before, we can view default
as a put on a house, or, in this case, a call on the mortgage where the
exercise price is the house value. Hence, the similarity between (3.12) and
(1.7).—31—
In this expanded model, intuition is complicated because two offsetting
effects exist. First, interest-rate variance raises the value of the default
option, and thus lowers the value of the mortgage, on the grounds that
increasing risk generally raises option values. Second, interest—rate variance
increases the value of the mortgage over its convex range because interest—rate
volatility raises prices of noncallable fixed—income securities (declines in r
raise value by more than increases lower it, as depicted in Figure 1). In the
Kau et al (1986a, Table 8) simulations, the second effect overcomes the first
except in the case of high values of house price variance or low down payment
(in which case D becomes very valuable and very sensitive to changes in r).
These simulations assume no correlation between r and H. One would
expect that high negative correlation between r and H (as would be expected
when real interest rates change) would make default less valuable because the
low house prices that trigger default would be associated with high interest
rates, which would make the existing low rate mortgage more valuable and thus
reduce the probability of default. Unfortunately, neither Epperson et al
(1985) nor Kau et al (l986a) considers simulations with a negativep.
2. Both Default and Prepayment for FRMs
Kau et al (l986a), Titrnan and Torous (1986) and Rosenberg (1986) consider
both default and prepayment. These models are similar to that just discussed,
but with both optimal prepayment and optimal default.25The free boundary
condition becomes the minimum of (1.8) and (3.12). Introducing prepayment
should make default less valuable because the critical interest rate at which
prepayment will trigger r, can exceed that at which default will trigger call,
rd (PAR, the exerciseprice for the prepayment call, is less than H, the
exercise price for default call). This situation is illustrated by the CM
curve lying below the BM curve in Figure 10. This intuition is somewhat—32—
confirmed in the Kau et al simulations (their Table 8 comparing contracts III
and VI); however, the comparisons with and without prepayment are of mortgages
with different coupons, and hence they are not quite comparable.26
3. Transaction Costs
Not surprisingly, the frictionless default model does not explain FHA
default data very well. Foster and Van Order (1984) estimate an "option-based"
model of default and find that even when equity is quite negative, the
probability of default is under 10 percent. Nonetheless, they and others (see
Campbell and Dietrich, 1983, and Swan's 1982 survey of the literature) find
that equity is a major factor in explaining default. This suggests the
inclusion of default costs in a way similar to the inclusion of transaction
costs in Section I.
In their pricing of mortgage default insurance, Cunningham and
Hendershott (1984) consider two types of costs:(1) costs to the borrower
(moving costs, lower credit rating, and lender recourse to the borrower's other
assets less free rent) and (2) costs to the lender, which they divide into lost
interest plus administrative costs and the cost of selling the house. We
denote the borrower costs by CB and the lender costs by CL +aH,whereis the
assumed proportional cost of selling the house, and incorporate these costs in
Figure 11, which is a modification of Figure 9 and thus is similar in purpose
to Figure 3 in which prepayment costs were added to the frictionless prepayment
model. To the borrower, the new exercise price is H +CBIand the solution is
the same as before, a tangency, but now with M = H+
CB.This determines the
new, lower critical house price, H':
(3.10') M (H',t) =1at M =H+C H C B
In the Figure, the value of the mortgage to the borrower is given by AM,
compared with the curve in the frictionless case, BM.—33-.
Again, a wedge exists between borrower and lender values. As in the
prepayment model, the lender's (and hence the market's) value is determined by




As can be seen from the figure, if CL andare zero, then M(H,t) to the lender
is always greater if the borrower has transaction costs (curve CM), but if the
lender's costs are large enough, 4 may be worth less than in the frictionless
case (curve DM).27
This model is straightforward, but if we pursue the effects of costs more
thoroughly, we are forced to face up to some complications. Consider the cost
of selling a house and moving into a new one, and suppose that borrowers move
at random intervals. If a borrower is already moving, moving costs do not act
as a deterrent to default and the existence of selling costs acts as an
incentive. That is, default costs for movers, C, are significantly less than
costs for those who do not have to move, CB (Cunningham and Hendershott, 1984).
Thus, default is more likely for those who have to move. Moreover, default now
depends on a personal characteristic.
Foster and Van Order (1984) suggest that we might extend the model by
assuming that, for borrowers with positive H_M+CB, default is the intersection
of two events:(1) negative equity after selling costs, and (2) the occurrence
of some event (more than likely a bad one) that entails a move. A simple way
of modelling this is to introduce a new state variable similar to the random
prepayment variable in Dunn and McConnell (1981), which has a Poisson
distribution and takes on a unit value when people move. This also alters the
boundary conditions: when the random prepayment variable is zero, people will
only default if H =
M_CB;but if the variable is unity, they will default if H—34—
=
M—C.
Note, however, that the extension really introduces additional state
variables (sickness, divorce, unemployment, etc.) and that the model should be
expanded to account for optimizing should these events take place.
Finally, we note that households should be expected to default ARMs more
frequently than FRM5 (and the value of D for ARMs should generally be greater
than that for FRMs). An increase in interest rates lowers defaults on FRNs,
because existing loans now have below-market rates, but raises defaults on
ARMs, because of the payment shock from the rate increases. Defaults on both
instruments are largely independent of interest—rate declines because both stay
at par (FRM5 are called).28
C. Mortgage Insurance Contracts
Currently FHA is charging a one—time upfront fee to insure (100%) FHA
mortgages. As noted above, in the absence of transaction costs, the "fair" fee
should equal the value of the default option in the simple (constant interest
rate) model. When interest rates are allowed to vary, when coverage is less
than 100 percent (and pays off at PAR rather than market), and especially when
transaction costs are introduced, the calculation is altered in significant
ways.
The basic partial-differential equation for an insurance contract is
essentially the same as (3.11), but with a fee paid to the insurer replacing
the coupon payment. The problem is to find the appropriate "upfront" premium,
given the fee payment (zero for FHA)
29The difficulty in pricing insurance is
the complicated boundary condition describing the payout at default.
The critical house price at which default occurs is given by (3.10'). At






CB and CL are the costs discussed above and a is the fractional cost of selling
the house. With 100 percent coverage on the PAR, not the market, value of the
mortgage, the insurer pays I =PAR-
[(l_a)H_CLIand the lender gains PAR -
Privatemortgage insurance is more complicated in that insurers pay a
fraction, 8, of the claimable amount (principal balance, delinquent interest,
taxes and insurance paid, legal fees and miscellaneous expense). The insurers
loss is then 8(PAR +CL),and the lender loses M -(1—cx)H +(l8)CL PAR.
One point of interest is whether a one state (house price) or two state
(house price and interest rate) model is needed to value insurance contracts.
Asay (1978) shows and Epperson et al (1985) confirm that the interest-rate state
variable may not be needed. When the interest-rate variance rises from a
moderate to a high level (Table 5, scenario II versus IV), the value of theup-
front insurance fee changes by less than one percent.
IV. Realistic Pricing and Testing: Suggestions for Future Research
Early research on pricing mortgages was triggered by an interest in
explaining changes in spreads between yields on mortgages traded in the rapidly
expanding secondary market and on Treasuries. The GNMA—Treasury spread fell
throughout the early and middle l970s, an observation attributed to increased
efficiency of the GNMA market. However, the spread rose in the late l970s and
early l980s, something which could not be attributed to increased efficiency. At
about that time (see Hendershott and Villani, 1981), attention shifted to the
call aspect of mortgages; yield spreads could increase because of changes in
interest rate volatility or the shape of the yield curve.—36—
HendershOtt, Shilling and Villani (1982) regressed the "true" GNMA—
Treasury spread (see Hendershott, Shilling and Villani, 1983) on a proxy for
the value of the call option (the spread between 20-year utility bonds, with 5—
years call protection, and industrial bonds, with 10-years call protection)and
the extra taxation of GNMAs at the state and local level. Both variables were
statistically significant. Brooks and Quick (1983) regressed conventionally—
measured GNMA yields on a set of variables that included interest rate
volatility and the slope of the yield curve. While that paper was not intended
as a test of option pricing models, it confirmed their propositions that
greater variance and a more downward sloping yield curve tend to raise GNMA
rates (relative to Treasuries).
This interest in explaining market prices and yields is largely
absent from the formal pricing literature; few studies attempt to obtain
realistic price estimates and even fewer compare estimates with market prices.
Buser, Hendershott, and Sanders (1985) obtain estimates of a five—percent
life—of-loan rate cap on ARNs for historically observed term structures and
measures of interest—rate volatility, but data on ARMs with this cap are not
available for comparison. Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) estimate fair
market fees for FHA default insurance for different maturity fixed—rate
mortgages over a range of loan-to—value ratios under various assumptions about
borrower transaction costs and realistic estimates of FHA losses if default
occurred. Because FHA has historically charged a single fee for all mortgages
and loan-to—value ratios, market fees could not be contrasted with the
estimates.
Only Hall (1985) and Titman and Torous (1986) compare price estimates
with market prices. Using a variant of the one-state models in Section I, Hall
claims some confirmation that the call option in GNMAs is priced properly, but
the data are too shaky to support rigorous inference. Using a variant of the—37—
two—state variable models in Section III, Titman and Torous loosely confirm
that the default option in commercial mortgages (an area where "ruthless"
exercise is more plausible) is priced properly, but uncertainty about the
variance of changes in property prices makes testing difficult. Dunn and
singleton (1986) attempt an indirect test of the efficiency of the GNMA market,
but they do not test specific option—based pricing models.
That some researchers seem more concerned with whether mortgages can
default during or only at the end of the month than with homeowner's obvious
reluctance to default when they have negative equity or with the large losses
insurers suffer when default occurs illustrates the sharp division of labor
that exists in modern economics, which permits one to distain interest in
weighing one's explanations against real—world phenomena. The time is ripe for
applied econometricians to turn to this field, and they are beginning to do so.
In this closing section, we first draw together the useful results of the work
to date and then suggest needed extensions of the models.
A. Structuring and Specifying the Pricing Model
Application of the pricing methodology requires specifying state
variables and parameters values. These two decisions are discussed in turn.
1.The Needed Number of State Variables
The computational complexities of the backward solving pricing methods
are such that minimizing the number of state variables is important. Indeed,
to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet worked with a three state variable
model. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that possibly four state variables
are needed for pricing: two interest rate variables to model call, house price
to model default/insurance, and a fourth variable to model ARMs or CMOs where
keeping track of past interest rates (prepayments) is crucial. Fortunately,
this list can be pared.—38-
Analysis in process by Buser, Hendershott and Sanders (1987) indicates
that only one interest-rate state variable is needed because a one—state
interest—rate process can be specified that closely approximates prices from a
given two—state process. That is, even if the interest rate process were
"known"tobe driven by two state variables, a one state process can be used in
computing prices for a wide range of parameters. Other economies follow from
the simulations of Epperson, Kau and their colleagues (1985, 1986 ab). Because
these were discussed earlier, they are just summarized here:
(1) one state variable is sufficient to price fully default-insured
mortgages (GNMAs); even though default raises value when the defaulted
mortgage is below—par, the impact is trivial,
(2) one state variable is sufficient to price default insurance; even
though interest—rate declines could raise the market value of mortgages
sufficiently to trigger default, the impact is trivial, and
(3) often a forward pricing (Monte Carlo) methodology is sufficient to
price default—free ARMs; only when interest—rate volatility is high and
floors of less than two percentage points per adjustment are being
analyzed does the call on ARMs have more than a trivial value.
2. Pararneterizing the Models
Brown and Dybvig (1986) use the CI&R term-structure model to estimate the
parameters of the underlying process [equation (1.1') above] for the short
rate. This is relatively easy to accomplish because the CI&R model (with one
state variable) yields a closed form solution for the price of a zero—coupon,
risk—free security, and the solution is a nonlinear function of three
parameters, r, and t. Using nonlinear least squares, these parameters can be
estimated on any date with that day's yield curve. From these estimates, the
variance parameter, c in (1.1') can be inferred. The remaining parameters
cannot be uniquely determined, but if we know one of them (e.g.,A), we can
determine the other two (9 and k).—39—
Titman and Torous exploit their model and end—of—month yield curve data
to estimate end-of-month mortgage prices.32 A key to using the yield curve
data is the observation (in Titman—Torous and Buser, Hendershott, and Sanders,
1985 and 1987) that for a given set of data the answer to the mortgage pricing
problem is invariant to the value of A in the sense that if we pick an
arbitrary x,say'useA to infer 8 and k from the Brown-Dybvig model, and
then use that 8, k and X to estimate M, our answer is invariant to the choice
of .Infact, Buser, Hendershott and Sanders (1987) argue that
combination of 8, k and .which,along with an estimate of c, reproduces the
yield curve will give call values within a percent or two of any other (for
either one or two state variable models).
The reason for this can be seen from examining the equilibrium condition
(1.4) in the one state variable model in Section I. The expected growth in
interest rates (which is determined by 8, k and r) and the price of risk (A)
enter together and additively in the term multiplied by M. They do not enter
in any other term or in the boundary conditions. Hence, increasing one and
decreasing the other in the right proportion won't change the answer.
Intuitively, the pricing model arbitrages off the yield curve. Only the shape
of the yield curve matters; the specific contributions of expected interest
rate changes or risk aversion in forming this shape are irrelevant (Buser,
Hendershott and Sanders, 1985 and 1987).
In contrast, no analogue to the term structure exists from which we can
deduce the expected split of housing returns between appreciation and rental
flow. Thus house prices must be modelled explicitly. Data are a problem in
estimating such models because few sources exist of transaction prices on the
same houses over time at frequent intervals. Foster and Van Order (1984) use—40-
an indirect approach to infer the variance of house pricesfrom a default
model. In any event, getting up—dated estimates of the growth rate (orrental
flow) and variance of house price changes will be difficult.
B. The Future for Option Pricing Models
Because of the large amounts of money involved in trading mortgages, a
competitive market exists in mortgage models. The market is onWall Street,
and it is one with imperfect information in the sense that little is published
about the pricing models used by investment bankers. However, from what we can
infer from nontechnical publications and private discussions,
(1)an appreciation exists of the importance of the option aspects
discussed above. For instance, Askin et al (1987), discussing
Drexel—Burnham'S model, refer to the Cox, Ross, Rubenstein (1979)
approach to option pricing as the basis of this model, and the
Salomon Brother's model, apparently uses a Monte Carlo approach to
option pricing (Waldman and Gordon, 1986). The output of these
models is (see also Jacob and Toevs, 1987) either an option—based
price or an option-adjusted yield.
(2) however, the centerpiece of Wall Street research is the recognition
that prepayments are very complicated and need to be modelled as
more than a boundary condition. For instance, the Salomon Brothers
model downplays the rigor of the option model by making prepayment a
direct function of interest rates (rather than mortgage price, which
the strict model implies is the right variable) and in that way
Monte Carlo techniques in conjunction with their prepayment model
can be used without the endogeniety problem discussed in I-C above.
This approach is also followed at Goldman, Sachs & Co. and, we
expect, other Wall Street firms.
For obvious reasons we have nothing to report on the details of the
prepayment functions used by investment bankers. Preliminary work by Greenand
Shoven (1986) and Foster and Van Order (1984, 1985) suggests that more is
involved in the sluggishness of exercising the prepayment or default option
than can be captured by simply adding transaction costs. In particular, a
simple transaction—costs model would imply that mortgage prepayments should be
closely clustered, which does not seem to be the case. While an additive
transaction costs term of the appropriate magnitude might yield accurate prices—41—
for GNMAs (although the market for models does not suggest this possibility is
taking seriously), the term would be unlikely to yield accurate prices for the
different tranches of CMOs. Even if "averag&t prepayment for the GNMA pool can
be made equivalent to gradual prepayment, with average prepayment the short
tranche would prepay too slowly and the long tranche too rapidly.
If the formal pricing models are to be successful in the competitive
market for models, far more serious treatment of prepayment will be necessary.
We have two alternative suggestions for researchers:
(1) estimate a probabilistic model of prepayment, along the lines of
Foster and Van Order (1985), assuming that the percent of mortgages which
prepay is a nonlinear function of the difference between market and/or
par values. Then add this function to the coupon, scrapping the boundary
condition (1.7) for frictionless call. The nonlinearity of the
prepayment function would generate the negative convexity depicted in
Figure 2.
(2) assume transaction costs as in Buser and Hendershott (1984) or
Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) but let the costs vary across
borrowers. Specifically, the mean and variance of the distribution of
transaction costs can be estimated from prepayment data via maximum—
likelihood techniques. These models could then be used to price
mortgages with different transaction costs, and the value of the pool of
mortgages would be the sum of the value of the individual mortgages.
This procedure would permit analysis of the effect of changes in
transaction costs.—42—
Footnotes
1For a short survey of the published mortgage pricing research prior to 1986,
see Hendershott (1986). Of course, much research is also being conducted by
Wall Street firms (see Fabozzi, 1985 and 1987).
2CI&R show how (1.1), (1.1'), or generalizations of them might arise in a
general equilibrium model.
By complete we mean that if there are n state variables (e.g., interest rates
upon which M depends), then there must be at least n independent securities
that depend on these state variables. This is necessary for the hedge
portfolio to be created.
The intuition is that the hedge portfolio is perfect insurance and can be
created with constant returns to scale. Hence the x's are the linear prices
that would be charged for a competitive insurance contract.
See Malliaris and Brock (1981) for a discussion and some applications.
6
The reader will probably note the similarity of this issue to the proposition
(Jensen's Inequality) that E[F(X)]F[E(X)] if F is nonlinear.
Technically, uncertainty requires keeping some of the second order effects in
the Taylor expansion used to approximate M. The "½" in (1.3) comes from this
second order term.
8
In the implementation of pricing models, prices are calculated over a finite
interest—rate grid, the highest value of which is far (infinity) short of
infinity. A reasonable boundary condition here is that the valuation function
is smooth (M=0)at extreme r's. rr—43—
The solutions to (1.4) that satisfy (1.5) and (1.6) can never intersect (in
Figure 2). Hence, a trajectory that minimizes the value of M for a single r
minimizes value for all r's.
10
This problem cannot be finessed by manipulating the choice of state variable
because the hedge portfolio used to eliminate instantaneous risk must contain
the instantaneous T-bill rate.
This possibility can become a probability for highcoupon GNMAs on
nonperforming rental properties.
12
Kau et al (1986a) use interest rate uncertainty scale parameters [a in
equation (1.1')] of 0.05 and 0.15; over the last decade this parameter has
varied between roughly 0.015 and 0.05. Thus their lowparameter value is at
the high end of historical experience. For the house priceuncertainty scale
parameter [am (3.1') below], they use the same values; other authors have used
values ranging from 0.08 to 0.12. We interpret's of 0.05 (interestrate) and
0.15 (house price) as a high variance world.
13
Cassidy (1983) and Dietrich et al (1983) provide estimates of the value of
due on sale; Hendershott (1986) discusses the estimates.
14
For a fuller discussion of transaction costs, see Dunn andSpatt (1986).
15
Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) discuss how risk can be handled.
16
Whether CMOs have lowered mortgage rates to borrowers isa separate
empirical question. Brooks and Quick (1983) find some evidence thata dummy
variable for CMOS has a negative effect on GNMA rates, but inthe best
specified equations in the paper, the effect is small (10 to 20 basispoints)
and of questionable significance.—44—
17This discussion draws heavily on Roll (1986).
18If current income is more important to some investors than is true economic
income, then strips with artificially high coupons have "extra" value.
19A highly placed investment banker has suggested that investing in both the
10 and the P0 could be superior to investing in the underlying mortgage. If
interest rates rise, the capital loss on the P0 can be taken against current
income, while the capital gain on the 10 can be allowed to ride. If interest
rates fall, the 10 can be sold and the P0 retained.
20This discussion draws heavily on Roll (l987a).
21In addition, up to two percent overcollateralization seems to be required in
order to establish equity investment by the creator of the CMO. The new REMIC
vehicle introduced in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which can be classified as an
asset sale rather than debt issue, removes this requirement.
22With an 1½pointup—front fee, the 0.35% drops to 0.11% (Table II).
23
solving for s, s =r+ - uH/H.Some might recognize this as the
rental cost equation for owner-occupied housing in the absence of taxes.
24
Epperson et al (1985) and Kau et al (1986a) modify the default model by
arguing that defaults will not happen until a payment is due, so that for a 30—
year mortgage there is a string of 360 European options instead of a boundary
condition that applies continuously.—45—
25
Kau et al (1986a) assume that default occurs only at the end of the month,
while prepayment can happen anytime. We presume, although no simulations
analyze the difference, that whether or not defaults occur at intervals or
"continuously" is of little consequence.
26
In particular, their experiments hold price constant and look at required
coupon.
27
Because the curves come from the same partial differential equation,
differing only by boundary conditions, they cannot cross (see footnote 9).
28
Note that if there are costs of refinancing, ARMswilldefault less than
FRMs when interest rates fall. Hence, it is possible that D will be worth more
for FRMs than ARMs when rates are expected to fall.
29
Insurers receive their income from borrowers as an annual fraction of the
remaining balance as long as the contract is in force plus a larger one—time
first year fee. The latter varies with the initial loan—to—value, the extent
of the coverage (fraction of claimable amount), and the type of mortgage (ARM
insurance is more expensive, as was argued above).For over 20% coverage, the
continuing fees are 30 basis points for FRMs with loan-to-values of 90% or
less, 35 basis points for loan-to—values above 90%, and 40 basis points for
"nonfixed-payment loans" (ARMS, short—term balloons, and GPMs).(These prices
are from Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Corporation's premium schedule dated May
1, 1985; MGIC's prices were constant for the 25 years prior to 1982 and since
then have been increased a number of times.)—46—
30
See Van Order (1987) for a synthesis and interpretation of the literature on
the appropriateness of FHA default insurance fees.
31
The analysis is further complicated by the possibility that the insurers
themselves may default (fail to perform). Thus the lender's potential loss is
I.
32
Note that the Titman-Torous procedure involves an internal inconsistency.
The pricing model assumes that k, e, and A are constant when making the
arbitrage argument, but the parameters are reestimated every month.—47—
References
Asay, M.R., Rational Mortgage Pricing, Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Southern
California, 1978, and Research paper #30, Fed. Res. Board, 1979.
Asay, M.R., "Pricing and Analysis of Common ARMProducts,"Mortgage Banking,
December 1984.
Askin, D.J., W.L. Hoffman and S.D. Meyer, "The Drexel-Burnham Mortgage Pricing
Model: The Complete Evaluation of the Option Component of Mortgage
Securities," Drexel, Burnharn, Lambert, Jan. 1987.
Bartter B. and R. Rendlemen, Jr. "Fee Based Pricing of Fixed Rate Bank Loan
Commitments." Financial Management, 13—20, Spring 1979.
Black F. and M. Scholes, "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,"
Journal of Political Economics, 81, 637-659, 1973.
Brennan M. and E. Schwartz, "Savings Bonds, Retractable Bonds and Callable
Bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 1, 67—88, 1977.
_____"Determinantsof GNMA Mortgage Prices," Journal of AREUEA, 13 (1),
209—228, 1985.
Brooks, S. and P. Quick, "CMO's and Secondary Mortgage Markets," unpublished
1983.
Brown S. and P. Dybvig, "The Empirical Implications of the Cox,Ingersoll,
Ross Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance,
41 (3), 617—632. 1986.
Buser, S.A. and P.R. Hendershott, "Pricing Default-Free Fixed—Rate
Mortgages," Housing Finance Review, 3, 1984.-48—
Buser, S. and P. Hendershott and A. Sanders, "Pricing Life of Loan Caps on
Default-Free Adjustable-Rate Mortgages," Journal of AREUEA, 13,3, 248-
260, 1985.
______"Doesthe Nature of the Interest Rate Process Affect the Value of
Pricing Claims with Interest Dependent Cash Flows?," April 1987.
Campbell, T. and J. Dietrich, "The Determinants of Default on Insured
Conventional Residential Mortgage Loans," Journal of Finance, 1569-1581,
December 1983.
Cassidy, H. "Monte Carlo Simulation Estimates of the Expected Value of the Due
on Sale Clause in Home Mortgages," Housing Finance Review, January 1983.
Cox J., and J. Ingersoll and S. Ross, "A Theory of the Term Structure of
Interest Rates," Econometrica, 53, 302—407, 1985a (the basics of this
analysis was contained in a 1976 working paper).
"An Intertemporal, General Equilibrium Model of Asset Prices,"
Econometrica, 53, 363-84, 1985b (the basics of this analysis was
contained in a 1976 working paper).
Cox J., and S. Ross and M. Rubinstein, "Option Pricing: A Simplified
Approach," Journal of Financial Economics, September 1979.
Cunningham, D. and P.H. Hendershott, "Pricing FHA Mortgage Default Insurance,"
Housing Finance Review, 3,4, 373-392, 1984.
Dale-Johnson, D. and T. Langetieg, "The Pricing of Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations", unpublished, 1986.—49—
Dietrich, J., T. Langetieg, D. Dale-Johnson and T. Campbell, "The Economic
Effects of Due on Sale Validation, Housing Finance Review, 19-32, January
1983.
Dothan, L. "On the Term Structure of Interest Rates, Journal of Financial
Economics, 6, 1, 59—69, 1978.
Dunn, K. and J. McConnell "Valuation of GNMA Mortgage—Backed Securities,"
Journal of Finance, 36, 599—617, 1981.
Dunn K. and K. Singleton, "An Empirical Analysis of The Pricing of Mortgage-
Backed Securities," Journal of Finance, 38 (2), 613-623, 1983.
Dunn K. and C. Spatt, "The Effect of Refinancing Costs and Market Imperfections
on the Optimal Call Strategy and the Pricing of Debt Contracts," March
1986.
Epperson, J., J. Kau, D. Kennan, W. Muller III, "Pricing Default Risk in
Mortgages," Journal of AREUEA, 13, 3, 261—72, 1985.
Fabozzi (ed.), The Handbook of Mortgage Backed Securities, Probus, Chicago,
1985.
______Mortgage-BackedSecurities, Probus, Chicago, 1987.
Foster, C. and R. Van Order, "An Option-Based Model of Mortgage Default",
Housing Finance Review, 3 (4) 351—372, 1984.
______"FHATerminations: A Prelude to Rational Mortgage Pricing," Journal
of AREUEA, 13, 3, 273—91, 1985.—50—
Findley, M.C. and D.R. Capozza, "The Variable Rate Mortgage: An Option Theory
Perspective," Journal of Money Credit and Banking, IX, 2, 356—364, 1977.
Green, J. and J.B. Shoven, "The Effects of Interest Rates on Mortgage
Prepayments," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, XVIII, 1, 41-59,
1986.
Hall, A. "Valuing Mortgage Borrowers Prepayment Option," Journal of AREUEA, 13,
3, 229—247, 1985.
Hendershott, P.H., "Mortgage Pricing: What Have We Learned So Far?", Journal
of AREUEA, Winter 1986, 497—509.
Hendershott, P.H. and S. Hu, "Accelerating Inflation and Nonassumable Fixed—
Rate Mortgages: Effects on Consumer Choice and Welfare," Public Finance
Quarterly, April 1982.
Hendershott, P.H. and J. Shilling and K. Villani, "Measurement of Spreads
Between Yields on Various Mortgage Contracts and Treasury Securities,"
Journal of AREUEA, Winter 1984, 476-490.
______"Determinationsof Home Mortgage Rates: Empirical Results for the
1975—81 Period," presented at the AFA/AREUEA meetings December 1982.
This study is reproduced in K. Villani, "Pricing Mortgage Credit," in
Handbook for Banking Strategy, Aspinwall and Eisenbas (eds), Wiley, New
York, 1985.
Kau, J, D. Kennan, W. Muller III and J. Epperson, "Rational Pricing of
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages," Journal of AREUEA, 1985.—51—
_____"OptionTheory and Fixed—Rate Mortgages," University of Georgia,
unpublished 1986a.
_____"TheValuation and Analysis of Adjustable Rate Mortgages," University
of Georgia1 unpublished 1986b.
Hendershott, P.H. andK.E.Villani, "The Terminations Premium in Mortgage
Coupon Rates: Evidence on the Interpretation of Mortgage and Bond
Markets," NBER W.P. 738, April 1981.
Jacob, D.P. and A.L. Toevs, "An Analysis of the New Valuation, Duration and
Convexity Models for Mortgage—Backed Securities," Morgan Stanley, January
1987.
Lea, M., "Rational ARMPricingand Design," in Solving the Mortgage Market
Problem, Proceeding of the 10th Annual Conference of the FI-JLB of San
Francisco, 1985.
Malliaris A. and W. Brock, Stochastic Methods in Economics and Finance, North
Holland, 1981.
Masulis, R., "Government Intervention in the Mortgage Market: A Study of
Anti-Redlining Regulations," Journal of Monetary Economics, 10 (2), 191-
213, 1982.
Merton, R., "The Theory of Rational Option Pricing," Bell Journal of
Economics, 4:141—183, 1973.
McDonald G., "A Note on the Methods Underlying Bond and MBS Arbitrage Pricing
Models," University of Virginia, 1987.—52—
Richard, S.B., "An Arbitrage Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates,"
Journal of Financial Economics 6(1), 33—57, 1978.
Roll, R. "Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Characteristics, History,
Analysis," 7—44, in Fabozzi (ed.), l987a.
_____"StrippedMortgage Backed Securities," Goldman, Sachs & Co., Mortgage
Securities Research, October 1986.
______"RecentInnovations in Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, "Goldman,
Sachs & Co., Mortgage Securities Research, January, l987b.
Rosenberg, Susan B., "A Continuous Time Model of Mortgages Under Interest Rate
and Home Price Uncertainty," unpublished Dissertation, Columbia Univ.,
1986.
Swan, C. "Pricing Private Mortgage Insurance," Journal of AREUEA, 276—296,
1982.
Titman, S. and W. Torous, "Valuing Commercial Mortgages: An Empirical
Investigation of the Contingent Claim Approach to Pricing Risky Debt,"
unpublished 1986.
Van Order, R., "User Fees and Mortgage Markets," Housing Finance Review,
forthcoming, 1987.
Vasicek, 0., "An Arbitrage Characterization of the Treasury Yield Structure,"
Journal of Financial Economics, 5(13) 177—188, 1977.
Waldman, M and M. Gordon, "Evaluating the Option Feature of Mortgage
Securities: The Salomon Brothers Mortgage Pricing Model," Salomon
Brothers, September 1986.—53—
Figure 1: Uncertainty and Expected Returns
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Figure 5: Values of 6 Percent and 12 Percent Strips and the Underlying MBS
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Figure7: Values of CMO Tranches and the Underlying MBSFigure 8: Value Functions for Callable and Noncallable FRMs and an ARM Whose








Figure 9: Price of a Defaultable FRM as a Function of House Value—62—
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Figure 11: Pricing Default with Transaction Costs
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